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We have studied invasion processes in two-strategy evolutionary games on a square lattice for imitation rule
when the players interact with their nearest neighbors. Monte Carlo simulations are performed for systems
where the pair interactions are composed of a unit strength coordination game when varying the strengths of the
self-dependent and cross-dependent components at a fixed noise level. The visualization of strategy distributions
has clearly indicated that circular homogeneous domains evolve into squares with an orientation dependent on the
composition. This phenomenon is related to the anisotropy of invasion velocities along the interfaces separating
the two homogeneous regions. The quantified invasion velocities indicate the existence of a parameter region in
which the invasions are opposite for the horizontal (or vertical) and the tilted interfaces. In this parameter region
faceted islands of both strategies shrink and the system evolves from a random initial state into the homogeneous
state that first percolated.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Evolutionary game theory was originally developed to
describe the macroscopic behavior of multiagent biological
and social systems [1,2] where the interactions between the
individuals are described by the concept of the payoff matrix
introduced in traditional game theory [3–5]. In recent decades
the methods of statistical physics have been applied compre-
hensively for the quantitative investigations of phenomena in
models where the individuals are distributed on a lattice (or
graph) and the interactions are limited to their neighborhoods
[6–8]. Previously it was recognized that the ferromagnetic
Ising model [9,10] can also be considered as a social (or
biological) model [11–14] where the neighboring individuals
benefit if they choose the same option (for recent reviews,
see Refs. [15–19]). The analogy in the macroscopic behavior
is valid if the evolution of strategy distribution is governed
by the logit rule [20–22] resembling the Glauber dynamics
of the kinetic Ising model [23]. The main advantage of the
application of the logit rule is that these systems evolve into
the Boltzmann distribution if the pair interactions are defined
by potential games for n strategies [19,24–26]. Consequently,
at low noises a long-range ordered strategy arrangement is
realized that transforms into a random strategy distribution
if the noise is increased. These phase transitions are well
described by the Ising or Ising-type models.
We have to emphasize, however, that in biologically
motivated evolutionary games the realistic dynamical rules
are generally based on imitation in agreement with the spirit
of Darwinian selection [1]. The application of the imitation
dynamical rule results in a significantly different macroscopic
behavior because all the homogeneous states become ab-
sorbing states [6]. When tuning the interaction parameters
the two-strategy systems can exhibit one or two consecutive
phase transitions between the two homogeneous states [6,7].
Two transitions occur if the two strategies can coexist in a
sufficiently large system. In the latter cases the extinction of
the minority strategy follows a universal behavior (belonging
to the directed percolation universality class [27–30]) when
approaching the critical points [31–33]. At the same time,
the numerical investigations [7,19,34] indicated a first-order
phase transition for those interactions where the strength of
coordination was sufficiently large.
In the models mentioned above the authors used the notation
of social dilemmas [4,35,36] when the first and second strate-
gies are called defection and cooperation. The payoffs quan-
tify: punishment for defection (P = 0), rewards for mutual
cooperation (R = 1), temptation to choose defection (T ), and
sucker’s payoff (S). In the latter terminology our investigation
is restricted to the region of the stag hunt game (T < 1 and
S < 0) [37,38] where both homogeneous pure strategy pairs
[(1,1) and (2,2)] are Nash equilibria. Although most of the
previous analyses of spatial social dilemmas are focused on the
weak prisoner’s dilemma (S = 0 and T > 1) [31,33,39], there
are some papers considering two-dimensional lattice systems
in the whole T − S parameter space for a fixed noise level or
using other versions of dynamical rules (for reviews see [6,7]).
When varying the payoff parameters, a sudden change between
the two homogeneous strategy arrangements was reported by
several authors who described that the final absorbing state
may depend on the initial strategy distribution [40–42].
Now our investigations will be focused on the motion of
interfaces separating the competing homogeneous phases. The
visualization of the interface motion indicated anisotropic
invasion velocities. Using a simple numerical method we
will quantify the average invasion velocities when varying
the payoff parameters for two (relevant) orientations. The
two-strategy multiagent potential game on a square lattice will
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be investigated by using a convenient parametrization of the
interactions. In the present study the interaction is composed
of a unit strength coordination game that is extended by self-
and cross-dependent components with variable strengths [43].
For the logit dynamical rule this system is equivalent to a
two-dimensional Ising model in the presence of a suitable
external magnetic field. It is already well known that if the
simulations of these systems are started from an artificial
initial state in which one of the strategies forms a sufficiently
large circular island in the sea of the other strategy, then the
growth (or shrinking) of this island only depends on the sign
of the external magnetic field. Conversely, if the evolutionary
rule is based on stochastic pairwise imitations [31] then our
simulations have indicated a surprisingly different behavior.
In a range of parameters in which both types of islands are
shrinking due to the anisotropic invasion velocity. The latter
feature implies the relevance of continuous percolation in the
formation of the final absorbing state.
In the next section we describe the model, discuss its
general features, and show the unexpected phenomena. The
quantitative analysis of the anisotropic invasion velocity is
detailed in Sec. III. The relationships between the anisotropic
invasion velocity, the phase diagrams including regions of
two possible final homogeneous states, and the continuum
percolation are discussed in Sec. IV. Finally, we briefly survey
the robustness and relevance of these phenomena.
II. THE MODEL AND ITS GENERAL FEATURES
We study evolutionary games with equivalent players
residing at the sites x of a square lattice with N = L2 sites and
periodic boundary conditions. Each player residing on site x
chooses one of her two options and plays matrix games with her
four nearest neighbors (denoted by sites x + δx). If the first
and second pure strategies are denoted by two-dimensional
Cartesian unit vectors, that is sTx = (1,0) or (0,1) (superscript
T refers to transpose), then the payoff can be described as
ux =
∑
δx
sx · Asx+δx, (1)
where the summation runs over all the neighboring sites
(x + δx). In the present work the payoff matrix A will be
defined by two parameters:
A =
(
1 −1
−1 1
)
+ ε
(
1 1
−1 −1
)
+ δ
(
1 −1
1 −1
)
=
(
1 + ε + δ −1 + ε − δ
−1 − ε + δ 1 − ε − δ
)
, (2)
where the first component refers to a coordination game of
unit strength. The second and third components define the
self- and cross-dependent payoffs with a strength of ε and
δ, respectively. In this notation the matrix component Aij
determines the payoff of player x if she uses the ith strategy
while the coplayer chooses the j th one.
It is worth noting that the exchange of strategy labels
(1 ↔ 2) for both players leaves the coordination compo-
nent unchanged, but reverses the strength of the self- and
cross-dependent components (δ → −δ and  → − simul-
taneously). As a result, the analysis of this system can be
constrained to the half-plane (now δ > 0).
For this parametrization of payoffs the potential matrix [19]
obeys the following form:
V =
(
1 + 2ε −1
−1 1 − 2ε
)
, (3)
which is independent of δ (the strength of the cross-dependent
component) and the potential of the whole system is given by
U (s) = 1
2
∑
x,δx
sx · Vsx+δx, (4)
that summarizes the contributions of pair potentials Eq. (3)
for the neighboring pairs only once in each microscopic
state s = {sx}.
If the so-called logit rule [19,24–26] controls the evolution
of the strategy distribution then the players can modify their
own strategy in a random sequential order exponentially
favoring their higher individual payoff with an assumption
that the neighboring strategies are fixed. This evolutionary
rule drives the system into the Boltzmann distribution, where
the probability of the state s is p(s) = eU (s)/K/Z and Z is a
normalizing factor. Here K quantifies the strength of noise and
plays the role of temperature in physical systems.
In the equilibrium at low noises the system prefers the
state s maximizing the value of potential. Accordingly, all the
players choose the first (second) strategy if ε > 0 (ε < 0) when
K → 0. IfK is increased for ε = 0, then this system undergoes
a critical order-disorder phase transition belonging to the Ising
universality class [44]. Indeed, the present evolutionary game
is equivalent to the ferromagnetic Ising model with a unit
coupling constant, where ε is the strength of the external
magnetic field.
The simplicity of the Ising model is exploited in a
wide range of research fields, including the investigation of
equilibrium states in magnetic systems, lattice gases, or social
systems, as well as the study of processes when the system
tends towards the equilibrium state [10,23,45,46]. In the
magnetic Ising models “spin up” (↑) and “spin down” (↓) states
are permitted at the lattice sites. It is well known, for example,
that the direction of the motion of the magnetic domain wall
(separating the ↑ and ↓ regions in the ferromagnetic phase at
low values of K) depends only on the direction of the magnetic
field (here the sign of ε). As a result, if the magnetic field
prefers the formation of ↑ phase then the islands of states ↓
shrink and vanish. By contrast, sufficiently large islands of the
↑ states in the sea of ↓ states grow and finally a homogeneous
state will dominate the system behavior.
In striking contrast to the above scenario, Fig. 1 illustrates
a significantly different phenomenon in the presence of the
cross-dependent component if stochastic pairwise imitation
governs the evolution. Namely, the consecutive snapshots,
achieved by Monte Carlo (MC) simulations, clearly show that
the circular domains transform into rectangular ones with an
orientation dependent on the type of domain. Subsequently,
both types of domains shrink and vanish.
First we emphasize that for δ > 0 the imitation of the first
strategy is beneficial for both the master and its follower
because the cross-dependent component provides a higher
income for both players. At the same time this advantage
is reduced by the self-dependent component if ε < 0. The
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FIG. 1. Evolution of the distribution of strategies 1 (black) and 2
(white) on the square lattice if the MC simulations are started from
a state where the minority strategies form a circular domain (with
a radius r = 100) as illustrated in the upper two snapshots at t = 0
MCS. The next two rows of snapshots show the distortion of domains
(at t = 500 MCS) that are shrinking continuously, as it is illustrated
in the bottom snapshots at t = 4000 MCS. These simulations are
performed for δ = 0.5, ε = −0.03, K = 0.3, and L = 400.
competition between these opposite effects results in the
behavior shown in Fig. 1 when the evolution is governed by
repeating the elementary steps described below.
In an elementary step of strategy updates, we first choose
two neighboring players (e.g., at sites x and x + δx) and the
first player (the follower) adopts the other’s (the master’s)
strategy with a probability [31] depending on the payoff
differences as
W (sx ← sx+δx) = 11 + e(ux−ux+δx )/K , (5)
that prefers the adoption of the strategy with a higher payoff.
In this formula, K quantifies the frequency of mistakes. The
above elementary steps are repeated N times in a Monte Carlo
step (MCS) during the simulations. For this dynamical rule all
homogeneous states are absorbing states, and the other strategy
cannot occur inside a homogeneous region. In the limit K →
∞ this system becomes equivalent to the voter model [47] that
exhibits a curious behavior on two-dimensional lattices [48].
The formation of faceted domains was already the subject
of intense investigations, because it plays a fundamental role
in crystal growth. Most of the related phenomena are well
FIG. 2. The sufficiently large and initially circular white (strategy
2) and black (strategy 1) domains exhibit opposite behaviors during
the evolutionary process at a high noise level (K = 3) for the same
payoff parameters we used in the simulations plotted in Fig. 1. The
snapshots show the strategy distributions at times t = 0 (upper), 1000
(middle), and 3000 MCS (lower).
described by suitable Ising models [49,50] and explained
by anisotropic interfacial energy, resulting in orientation-
dependent interfacial velocity in nonequilibrium systems.
At high noises the interfaces become irregular, diminishing
thereby the mechanisms yielding anisotropic invasion veloc-
ities. The consequences of the high noises are illustrated by
two series of snapshots (see Fig. 2) that show how the white
circular domain shrinks while the black one grows for the same
payoff parameters at a significantly higher noise level.
In light of these results the phenomenon at low noises (see
Fig. 1) can be explained by two observations: for the given
values of parameters, the white (strategy 2) territories are
invaded by the black (strategy 1) ones along horizontal and
vertical interfaces. On the other hand, the invasion velocity is
opposite along the tilted interfaces with slopes of ±1.
The mentioned features have motivated us to systematically
consider the effect of δ and  on the average invasion velocities
for these two orientations playing a key role in these dynamical
processes.
III. ANISOTROPIC INVASION VELOCITY
The average invasion velocities are determined by MC
simulations for fixed noise levels and system size (L = 1000),
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FIG. 3. Horizontal and tilted interfaces in the initial states used
for quantifying the interfacial velocities.
with variable payoff parameters (δ and ε). The initial states
have been set to have four strip domains (on the torus)
with parallel interfaces separating strategies 1 and 2 as it is
illustrated in Fig. 3. These states satisfy the periodic boundary
conditions and the interfacial energy (on the torus) has a local
minimum for both cases.
The numerical analyses are restricted to horizontal and
tilted (with a slope of 1) interfaces. During the simulations,
we have recorded the portions of strategies, ρ1(t) and ρ2(t)
(ρ1(t) + ρ2(t) = 1) and the average velocities are evaluated as
the derivatives of ρ2(t) with respect to time t in region where
ρ2(t) varies linearly. More quantitatively,
v = L
k
∂ρ2(t)
∂t
, (6)
if there are k interfaces in the initial states. To reduce the
statistical error this quantity is averaged over a sufficiently long
time period and 100 runs. Deviations from the linear decrease
and increase of ρ2(t) occurred both in the initial transient
period (typically t < 100 MCS) and when the interfaces
collided and annihilated.
As expected, the MC data (see Fig. 4) shows that both
types of invasion velocities increase when ε is decreased.
Notice, furthermore, that in the plotted region of ε, the invasion
of strategy 2 is always higher along the tilted interfaces,
compared to those occurring along the horizontal or vertical
ones. The most relevant message of Fig. 4, however, is that
we can distinguish two threshold values of ε, namely εh and
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FIG. 4. Average vertical velocity of the horizontal (open boxes)
and tilted (open diamonds) interfaces as a function of ε for δ = 0.5
and K = 0.3.
εt , where the average velocity vanishes along the horizontal
and tilted interfaces, respectively. More precisely, strategy
1 invades the territories of strategy 2, independently of the
orientation of interfaces separating them, if ε > εt . Conversely,
the system will evolve into the homogeneous state of strategy
2 (ρ2(t) = 1), if ε < εh. Quantitatively, εt = −0.0221(3) and
εh = −0.118(2) when δ = 0.5 and K = 0.3.
IV. CONSEQUENCES
The curious behavior, represented by the snapshots of
Fig. 1, can be observed in a narrow range of parameters
where the above discussed invasion processes favor opposite
strategies. A series of MC simulations have been performed
to check the robustness of these unexpected phenomena under
different conditions. First, we have repeated the above method
to determine the average invasion velocities as a function of δ
and ε at several noise levels. The results obtained for K = 0.3
are summarized in a phase diagram (see Fig. 5) where the gray
territory denotes the parameters for which the horizontal and
tilted interfaces move in opposite directions.
In other words, in the gray territory of the δ-ε plane the
system can evolve into both homogeneous strategy distribu-
tions and the final absorbing state depends on the initial ratio
of strategies if N → ∞. Notice, furthermore, that the sides of
symbols indicate the equivalent interface orientations.
The simulations have indicated similar results for K = 0.1
and 0.6 as plotted in Fig. 6. It is worth emphasizing that the
gray territory becomes wider if K is decreased.
During these analyses we faced different technical dif-
ficulties increasing the statistical errors and the necessary
run times of simulations. For example, at low noise levels
the strategy changes occur very rarely along the interfaces,
therefore we need long simulations to achieve a sufficiently
low relative statistical error. By contrast, for high noise levels
the development of interfacial irregularities causes difficulties.
In general, the quantification of the average velocities requires
the visualization of the pattern evolution in order to exclude the
appearance of a coexistence phase along the interfaces. This
coexistence phase as well as the two critical phase transitions
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
 0.0
 0.1
 0.0  0.5  1.0
ε
δ
1
2
1 or 2
FIG. 5. Boxes and diamonds indicate the values of δ and ε where
the velocity of the horizontal and tilted interfaces vanish for K =
0.3. In the gray territory both homogeneous absorbing states can
occur when varying the composition of the random initial strategy
distribution.
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FIG. 6. Boxes and diamonds indicate the threshold values of δ
and ε where the velocity of the horizontal and tilted interfaces vanish.
The filled and open symbols refer to interpolated data obtained for
K = 0.1 and 0.6, respectively. In order to illustrate the effect of noise,
the boundary lines of the gray territory show the same results plotted
in Fig. 5 at K = 0.3.
to one of the absorbing phases were described previously in
this system using a different payoff parametrization [7,31–33].
Now the fixed strength of coordination prevents the formation
of a coexistence phase on the δ-ε plane we studied.
The previous studies have indicated significant variations
in the behavior when the square lattice is replaced by other
two-dimensional lattices [7,33]. Despite it, similar behaviors
are observed when displaying the evolution of circular domains
on a square lattice when the players have collected payoffs
from games with their nearest and next-nearest neighbors.
The striking difference is that the orientations of the faceted
shrinking domains are the opposite of those plotted in Fig. 1.
These observations have motivated us to check what happens
when a triangular lattice (with six neighbors) is used to
describe the connectivity structure. In the latter case we could
distinguish hexagonal shrinking domains with two types of
orientations.
In these cases the invasion processes will eliminate all the
islands and the system evolves into the homogeneous state
that “first” spans the whole system. The phrase “first” refers
to neglecting the transients when the relevance of interfacial
invasions is not justified. Such a situation occurs, for example,
if the evolution is started from a random initial state, in which
case the mean-field approximation gives a more adequate
description.
In order to support the above expectation numerically, we
ran MC simulations where the system is started from an
uncorrelated random initial state with varying the probability
of strategy 1, i.e., ρ1(t = 0). The typical behaviors for large
sizes are illustrated by the MC results of ρ1(t) (see Fig. 7). For
large sizes the system evolves into one of the absorbing states
dictated by the limit value of ρ1(t) if t → ∞. The curves
plotted in Fig. 7 illustrate that limt=∞[ρ1(t)] = 1 (or 0) if
ρ1(t) > 0.5 [or ρ1(t) < 0.5] in agreement with the expecta-
tions deduced from the results of continuum percolation theory
[51,52]. To be more specific, in two-dimensional systems the
majority phase (it is strategy 1 if ρ1(t) > 1/2) spans the system
both horizontally and vertically in the thermodynamic limit
(N → ∞) [53,54]. In that case, the minority phase forms
 0
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ρ 1
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time [MCS]
FIG. 7. Time-dependence of the portion of strategy 1 if the
simulations are started from ρ1(t = 0) = 0.7, 0.6, 0.55, 0.54, 0.53,
and 0.5 (from top to bottom) for δ = 0.5, ε = −0.03, K = 0.3, and
L = 1000. The plotted MC data are averaged over 100 runs.
shrinking islands, and finally the system evolves into the
homogeneous absorbing phase of the majority strategy. The
threshold value of ρ1(t = 0), separating the limit states if
L → ∞, is estimated as ρth  0.536(3).
For small system sizes, however, the effects of randomness
(appearing in the random initial state and also in the con-
secutive elementary steps) can cause a significant deviation
from the limit behavior, particularly in the close vicinity of
the threshold values. The latter effect is demonstrated in Fig. 8
where the extinction probabilities as a function of time are
plotted for small sizes L in the vicinity of the threshold value,
more precisely, when ρ1(t = 0) = 0.54.
These results illustrate that both strategies can become
extinct after some time. For a fixed average initial composition
the average extinction times depend on the type of strategy
and the system size. As the initial value of ρ1(t = 0) is slightly
above the mentioned threshold value (see the appropriate curve
 0.0
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FIG. 8. Extinction probability of strategy 1 (solid lines) and 2
(dashed lines) vs. time for different system sizes (see the labels) for
ρ1(t = 0) = 0.54, δ = 0.5, ε = −0.03, and K = 0.3. These curves
are obtained by averaging over 1000 runs.
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in Fig. 7), the limit value of the extinction probability of
strategy 1 tends to zero if L is increased. Notice, furthermore,
that the extinction of strategy 2 is faster, in agreement with the
snapshots of Fig. 1, indicating a larger invasion velocity along
the tilted interfaces.
We emphasize that the mean-field approximation pre-
dicts a decrease of ρ1(t) from the symmetric [ρ1(t = 0) =
ρ2(t = 0) = 1/2] random initial state. This is the reason
why ρth > 1/2.
V. SUMMARY
Evolution of domain structures has been studied in two-
strategy evolutionary games with nearest-neighbor interac-
tions on a square lattice when both the interaction and the
dynamical rule favor the formation of homogeneous strategy
distributions at low noises. For this goal, in the present
systematic investigations, the pair interaction is dominated
by a coordination game (with a fixed strength) that favors
equally the formation of one of the two homogeneous phases.
The formation of a homogeneous final state is also supported
by the dynamical rule if it is based on imitating one of the
more successful neighbors. In the present work, the interaction
is extended by self- and cross-dependent components with
different strengths denoted by ε and δ.
For the application of logit rule the pattern evolution in these
systems at low noises becomes equivalent to those described by
the Ising model in the presence of an external magnetic field.
In the corresponding evolutionary games the self-dependent
component plays the role of magnetic field; meanwhile, the
cross-dependent component does not affect the evolution of
domain structure. This scenario is changed drastically when
an imitation-type dynamical rule controls the evolutionary
process.
For stochastic pairwise imitation the Monte Carlo simu-
lations have indicated that in a certain region of parameters
both types of circular domains shrink after evolving into
a square-like faceted shape with two different orientations.
This phenomenon can be explained by the opposite invasion
velocities along the horizontal (vertical) or tilted (with slopes
of ±1) interfaces. Using strip-like initial states we have
determined the average invasion velocities along the relevant
interfaces. Additionally, we have determined those regions of
the δ-ε plane in which the average invasion velocities along
the horizontal and tilted interfaces are opposite to each other.
In this parameter region both types of strategy islands shrink
and vanish sooner or later. Consequently, if a sufficiently large
system is started from a random initial state with a prescribed
composition then it will evolve into the homogeneous state that
percolates first throughout the whole battlefield with periodic
boundary conditions. This theoretical expectation as well as
the related final size effects are justified by Monte Carlo
simulations.
Now it turned out that the competition between the self- and
cross-dependent components may result in opposite motions
of the interfaces separating the two homogeneous states. The
most relevant consequence of this phenomenon is that the
system can evolve into both homogeneous absorbing states
when tuning the composition of the initial states. We have to
emphasize that this feature cannot be explored by using the
traditional numerical methods when all simulations are started
from symmetric random initial states while the parameters are
tuned.
The relevance of the previously discussed phenomena is not
limited to the two-strategy spatial evolutionary games since
the stochastic strategy imitation can eliminate strategies con-
secutively as it is already demonstrated in several n-strategy
systems [34,55–60]. In many cases the formation of the final
absorbing state may be determined by the competition of two
homogeneous territories, whereas the transient processes are
influenced by the additional strategies being present in the
initial states.
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